Competition Law Alert
June, 2012
ORDERS By COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
A.
Anti-Competitive Agreements
Synopsis
of the legal provisions
Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 (“Act”) prohibits an enterprise or
association of enterprises or persons to enter into agreements in respect of
production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or
provision of services, which causes or is likely to cause appreciable adverse
effect on competition in India.
Following kinds of
agreements between enterprises, persons or association of persons or
enterprises, or practices or decisions taken by association of persons or
enterprises, including cartels, engaged in similar or identical trade
of goods or provision of services is presumed to have appreciable adverse
effect on competition:
a) Agreements or decisions that directly or indirectly
determine purchase or sale price.
b) Agreements that limit or control production, supply,
market, technical development, investment or provision of services.
c) Agreements to share market or source of production
or provision of services by way of allocation of geographical area of market or
type of goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other
similar way.
d) Agreements that, directly or indirectly, result in
bid-rigging or collusive bidding.
However, agreements
entered into by way of joint ventures are excluded from above restriction if
such agreements increase the efficiency in production, supply, distribution,
acquisition, or control of goods or provision of services.
Under the Act, ‘cartel includes an association of producers,
sellers, distributors, traders, or service providers who, by agreement amongst
themselves, limit control or attempt to control the production, distribution,
sale or price of, or trade in goods, or provision of services’.
Further, under Section
19(3) of the Act, following factors are to be considered by Competition Commission of India (“CCI”) in determining whether an agreement
has appreciable adverse effect on competition:
a) Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market.
b) Driving existing competitors out of the market.
c) Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into
the market.
d) Accrual of benefits to consumers.
e) Improvement in production or distribution of goods
or provision of services.
f) Promotion of technical, scientific and economic
development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of
services.
In light of the above
provisions, we produce the summary of CCI’s orders passed in the month of June:
A.1 Varca
Druggist &Chemist and Others v. Chemist and Druggist Association of Goa, order delivered on June
13, 2012
Background facts and allegations:
· The
case was initiated on the complaint by Varca Druggist & Chemist and
Others (“Informant Varca”) against Chemist and Druggist Association of Goa (“Defendant Association”)
for indulging in restrictive trade practices.
· The Informant Varca alleged that the guidelines
framed by the Defendant Association (“Guidelines”)
for its members constitute an anti-competitive act under Section 3 of the Act. The
contentious provisions of the Guidelines are as follows:
(i) Pharmaceutical
companies could only appoint such stockiest /whole sellers, who are members of
the Defendant Association, and for whom a ‘No Objection Certificate’ (“NOC”)
has been received from the Defendant Association, which NOC is valid for six
months. Appointment of stockiests without NOC may result in, termination of
membership of the Defendant Association, a fine of Rs. 5000/- and a one year
ban on appointment of new stockiests.
(ii) After
two stockiests, each pharmaceutical company needs to satisfy sales thresholds
for further appointments, and no company is permitted to appoint more than five
stockiests. Stockiest appointments can be made once in an year. Mutual transfer
of stockiests is not permissible.
(iii) No
supply is to be made to any retailer by any wholesaler, unless such retailer
becomes member of the Defendant Association.
· Further,
Defendant Association mandated, a Product Information Service (PIS)
approval system, where only PIS approved drugs from the Defendant Association
could be introduced in the territory of Goa.
Rulings:
Jurisdiction
· The matter
was filed before the Director General of Investigation and Registration (“DGIR”),
MRTP Commission on June 16, 2009. Section 3 and 4 of the Act dealing with the
anti-competitive conduct were brought into force on May 20, 2009. On filing the
complaint, the DGIR undertook the preliminary investigation, which was still
pending when the MRTP Act was repealed vide ordinance dated October 14, 2009. As
the investigation had not culminated into
a ‘case’, the matter was transferred to CCI by the DGIR under Section 66 (6) of
the Act, as the allegations involved in the complaint were related to
restrictive trade practices of the Defendant Association.
· In
addition, while relying on the judgment of Bombay High Court in Kingfisher
Airlines Ltd. v. Competition Commission of India &Ors. (W.P No. 1785/200), CCI
observed that even in cases, where the alleged anti-competitive conduct was
started before coming into force of Section 3 and Section 4, CCI has the
jurisdiction to look into such conduct, if it continues even after the
enforcement of relevant provisions of the Act.
Anti-competitive
practice under Section 3 of the Act:
· CCI
observed that since the Defendant Association takes decisions relating to
distribution and supply of the pharmaceuticals
products on behalf of its members, who are engaged in similar or identical
trade of goods, the practice carried on, or the decisions taken by Defendant
Association as association of enterprise are covered within the scope of
Section 3(3) of the Act.
· CCI
found the practices of the Defendant Association to be restricting and controlling
the supply of drugs, as no person/ entity is allowed to do business of
pharmaceutical drugs as whole seller
and retailer, unless it becomes member of association, and no new product can
be introduced, nor can any new stockiest be appointed without an NOC, and PIS
approval (along with payment of payment of PIS approval charges) from the
Defendant Association.
· Creation of barriers to new entrants in the market- CCI found
that the manner of appointment of a new stockiest and its restrictive nature
creates entry barriers in the market.
· Driving existing competitors out of the market- CCI
observed that the agreements entered by wholesalers and retailers through Defendant
Association are agreements among competitors at the same level of value chain. Through their actions, the
wholesalers and retailers had attempted to ensure that if they do not abide by
the decision of the Defendant Association, they will be punished and they will
not get the stockiestship of the pharmaceutical companies.
· Foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into
the market- CCI observed that as per the MOU signed
between retailers and wholesalers, the wholesalers cannot directly sell
products to customers and
violation of this will lead to strict action by Defendant Association. Also,
the practice of issuing NOC to the new or additional stockiest; and mandating
PIS approval for introduction of drugs in a particular territory, was found to restrict
the number of players in the market and in turn also limited the supply of drugs
in violation of Section 3 of the Act.
· Determination of the purchase/sale price- The
Guidelines prescribes margins and the discount that may be extended by the
wholesalers and the retailers to the consumers. CCI observed that this practice
has the effect of indirectly
determining the sale price of the drugs and hence, violated the provisions of
Section 3(3)(a) of the Act.
Liability of the members of the Defendant
Association:
· CCI observed that as per Section 48 of the
Act, anti-competitive decision or practice of the association can be attributed
to the members who are responsible for running the affairs of that association
and actively participated in giving effect to the anti-competitive decision or
practice of the association. Accordingly, CCI held that the members of the
executive body of the Defendant Association are also liable for the
anti-competitive conduct under provisions of Section 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the
Act.
Relief granted:
· The Defendant
Association and its members were directed to ‘cease and desist’ from indulging in and following practice,
which have been found anti-competitive under Section 3 of the Act.
· The Defendant Association was further
directed to file an undertaking that Guidelines and the MOU with respect to following
matters shall be done away with within sixty days from the date of the receipt
of the order:
(i)
non-appointment of the stockiest or
wholesaler from amongst the non-members of the Defendant Association;
(ii)
requirement of NOC from the Defendant
Association for appointment of stockiest or wholesaler;
(iii) limit
on number of stockiest of pharmaceutical companies;
(iv) introduction
of only PIS approved drugs from the Defendant Association in the territory of
Goa; and
(v)
requirement of routing of bids for
supply of drugs to the government and hospitals through authorized stockiest
only.
· The Defendant
Association was also directed to remove within sixty days from the date of
receipt of the order, clauses in the circulars, MOU and the Guidelines, which
lay down the margins for wholesalers
and retailers in the category of non-scheduled drugs, prescribing a cap on the
amount of discount a wholesaler can give to the retailers, and prohibiting the
retailers from giving any discount to the consumers.
· A penalty of Rs. 2,00,000/- was also
imposed on the Defendant Association, which shall be paid within sixty days
from the date of receipt of the order.
A.2 Builders’
Association of India v.
Cement Manufacturers’ Association & Others, order delivered on June 20, 2012.
Background facts and allegations:
·
The information was filed by Builders’ Association of India
(“Builder Association”) under Section 19 of the Act against Cement
Manufactures Association (“CMA”) and 11 other cement manufacturing
Companies (together “Cement Manufacturers”) for violation of Section 3
and Section 4 of the Act.
·
The Cement Manufacturers named as opposite party 2 to opposite
party 9 in the complaint are the leading manufacturers, distributors and sellers
of cement, and together they control 75% market share of cement production in
India. As per Director General’s (“DG”)
report, prices of cement of the Cement Manufacturers have been very close to
each other (within a range of 0.5%) in the entire country in a given period of
time.
·
DG in its
report noted that the production capacity of the cement has increased from 157 MMT
in 2005-06 to 287 MMT by the end of March, 2011. However, the capacity
utilization was on a continuous
downward trend from 2008-09, even during the period when the demand was high. Builder
Association alleged that Cement Manufacturers deliberately underutilized the
production capacity and dispatch, in spite of high demand to create artificial
scarcity and increase cement prices.
·
As per DG’s
report, CMA nominated different companies in 34 different centers throughout
the country to collect and disseminate retail and wholesale prices of cement to
CMA. The common platform of CMA was used for collection and dissemination of
prices of different cement companies. Based on this information, different
companies came to know about prices of all companies prevalent in different
zone of the country. The prices of the cement were discussed in the meeting of
the CMA and prices of the cement of all top companies increased after
conclusion of certain CMA meetings (like February 24, 2011 and March 04, 2011).
Further, CMA’s internal publications contained details of the production and
dispatch of each plant of the member companies.
·
The Builder
Association alleged that Cement Manufacturers have engaged themselves in
cartelization by fixing prices of the cement using CMA as platform.
Rulings
Requirement of the
Written Agreement and Circumstantial Evidence
·
Negating the Cement Manufacturers’ contention of the absence
of a written agreement between them, CCI observed that existence of a written
agreement is not necessary to establish common understanding, common design,
common motive, common intent or commonality of approach among the parties to an
anti-competitive agreement. These aspects may be established from the
activities carried on by them, from the objects sought to be achieved, and
evidence gathered from the anterior and subsequent relevant circumstance. Circumstantial
evidence concerning the market and the conduct of market participants may
also establish an anti-competitive agreement and suggest concerted action.
Parallel behavior in price or sales is indicative of a coordinate behavior
among participants in a market.
Lower Capacity Utilization
· Negating the contention that low capacity
utilization was attributable to low demand, CCI observed that market was always
in a position to absorb the supplies, since in all other months the quantity
produced and supplied was almost wholly consumed. CCI held that the lower
dispatch in the month of the November- December, 2010-11 than the actual
consumption in the corresponding months of the year 2009-10, coupled with lower
capacity utilization in these months, establishes that the cement companies indulged in controlling and limiting the supply
of cement in the market. CCI observed that in November-December, 2010, the Cement
Manufacturers had reduced the production together, although in 2009 while in
some cases there was drop in production, in many cases there was increase also.
This established that there was a coordinated effort on part of the cement
Manufacturers to reduce supplies by curtailing production. Cement
Manufacturer’s reduced production and dispatch, of cement, even when demand was
positive during November and December 2010 and thereafter raised prices in the
month of January, 2011 and February 2011 in times of high demand. CCI
specifically noted that the prices increased in the month of January, 2011 and
February 2011, after the meetings of high powered committee of CMA.
·
Accordingly,
CCI held that CMA and the Cement Manufacturers indulged in limiting and
controlling the production and supplies in the market in violation of
provisions of Section 3(3)(b) of the Act, which prohibit any agreement or
arrangement among the enterprises which limits or controls the production or
supplier in the market.
Fixation of price in CMA meetings
·
CCI noted
that Cement Manufacturers meet frequently at the platform of CMA, which gave
them ample opportunities to discuss production, dispatch and prices. CMA collected
retail prices and wholesale prices through the competing companies on weekly
and monthly basis, which further provided them opportunity to discuss and
exchange information on prices. The production and dispatch details of each
company were circulated to all the members by CMA. CMA was also engaged in
benchmarking exercise in respect of its members. CCI therefore held that, it was
evident that the competing cement companies exchanged information and got to
know each other’s production, dispatch and prices.
·
CCI further
observed that the fact that such institutionalized interactions facilitated
exchange of sensitive information is demonstrated by the parallel behavior of
prices, production and dispatch among the competing cement companies. Under
this arrangement, CMA collected price through a network of cement companies and
the cement companies got an opportunity to know about the prices of each other.
CMA not only collected prices but also circulated and disseminated information
on capacities and production of competing cement companies.
·
CCI held that
above evidences are indicative of the fact that the Cement Manufacturers met
frequently in various meetings organized by CMA and collected retail and whole
sale prices using the platform of CMA. It is also noted that the details of actual production,
available capacities of competing cement companies were also circulated by CMA.
In view of these facts, CCI observed that price parallelism did not remain a
mere reflection of non-collusive oligopolistic market but mirrored a condition
of coordinated behavior and existence of an anti-competitive agreement in
violation of provisions of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act, which prohibits any
agreement or arrangement amongst enterprises, which directly or indirectly,
determines the price in the market. CCI further noted that the parallel
movement of prices of all Cement Manufacturers established that the Cement
Manufacturers are in agreement and acting in concert to fix prices of cement in
contravention of provisions of Section 3(3)(a) of the Act.
Relief
granted
·
A penalty of 0.5 times of net profit for 2009-10
(from 20.05.2009) and 2010-2011 has been imposed in case of each of the Cement
Manufacturers.
·
The Cement
Manufacturers were ordered to ‘cease
and desist’ from indulging in any activity relating to agreement, understanding or arrangement on
price, production and supply of cement in the market.
·
CMA should disengage and disassociate itself from
collecting wholesale and retail prices through the member cement companies and also
from circulating the details on production and dispatches of cement companies
to its members.
B.
Abuse of Dominant Position
Synopsis of legal provisions
Section 4 of
the Act prohibits any enterprise or group to abuse its dominant position. ‘Dominant
position’ has been defined to mean ‘a
position of strength enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in
India, which enables it to –
(i)
operate independently of competitive forces
prevailing in the relevant market; or
(ii)
affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant
market in its favor’.
B.1 All Odisha Steel Federation v. Orissa Mining Corporation Limited, decided
by CCI on June 19, 2012
Background facts and allegations:
· All
Odisha Steel Federation (“Informant Federation”) is an
association of manufacturers of steel and related industries in the state of Orissa. The Informant Federation filed
information under Section 19(1) of the Act against the Orissa Mining
Corporation Limited (“OMC”) for alleged contravention of Section 4
of the Act.
· OMC
invited bids through the method of Price Tender Setting (“PTS”), in which every company
regardless of its capacity, size and past lifting record was invited to
participate by quoting tender prices. Under Clause 9 of the PTS, OMC had the discretion
to either accept the quoted price or fix suitable price considering the market
scenario. In order to out-bid other buyers, certain companies quoted
unreasonably high prices. The highest price was adopted by OMC as benchmark
price for the sale of iron-ore.
· The Informant
Federation highlighted one such instance of unfair practice by OMC, where OMC offered
15000 metric tonnes of iron ore for sale through PTS during the first quarter
of 2011-12, but once the highest price was adopted as the benchmark price, the
total output of 4,02,500 metric tonnes of iron ore was sold at same price.
Rulings:
Position of the Opposite Party in the Relevant Market
· Given
to the miniscule 9.52% market share of the Opposite Party in the total tradable
quantity of the domestic sale of iron ore, CCI observed that Informant
Federation could have obtained iron ore from various other players in the fragmented
market. Therefore, OMC did not satisfy the requirements of being in a dominant
position in the relevant market.
B.2 M/s Vidanto Investment Pvt. Ltd. and Shri Ashokm
Jain v. M/s Vaidehi-Akash Housing Pvt. Ltd, decided
on June 29, 2012.
Background facts and
allegations:
· The
complaint was filed by the M/s Vidanto Investment Private Limited and Shri
Ashok Jain (together referred to as “Informants”) against M/s
Vaidehi-Akash Housing Private Limited (“Opposite Party”) under Section
19(1)(a) of the Act. Informants purchased flats from the Opposite Party in
Andheri West, Mumbai. Informants made various allegations on the Opposite
Party, few of them are listed below:
(i) That
the Opposite Party made inordinate delay in executing the project and abused
its dominant position by imposing highly arbitrary and unfair conditions on Informants.
(ii) That
the Opposite Party concealed material information from the Informants, before
entering into the agreement with them.
(iii) That the
Opposite Party carried out the construction work without the approval of layout
plan as per CRZ regulation which had serious fallouts and for which entire
liability was shifted on to the Informants in their capacity of allottees.
(iv) That
the Opposite Party had issued advertisement for launching project without
purchasing the land and not disclosing the total area, date of delivery of
possession and information of progress of work to buyers.
Ruling and relief granted:
· CCI held
that the filing of information by the Informants was an attempt of forum
shopping or forum hunting. CCI
noted that the Informants had also moved to the National Consumer Redressal Commission
and High Court of Bombay, seeking redressal of the grievances arising out of
the agreement, which was subject matter of the information.
· Informants
neither alleged nor pleaded for the abuse of dominant position by the Opposite
Party in any relevant market. No competition issues were raised or otherwise
arise from the information supplied.
Therefore, CCI noted that there exists no prima
facie case and the matter was closed in accordance with the provisions of
section 26(2) of the Act.
C.
Combination
Registration
C.1 Combination Registration No. C-2012/05/55
filed by Wireless Broadband Business Services Private Ltd decided on June 06,
2012
·
Wireless
Broadband Business Services Private Limited (“WBSPL”),
Wireless Broadband Business Services (Delhi) Private Limited (“WBBS Delhi”), Wireless Broadband
Business Services (Haryana) Private Limited (“WBBS Haryana”) and Wireless
Broadband Business Services (Kerela) Private Limited (“WBBS Kerela”)
filed a notice dated May 08, 2012 under Section 6 (2) of the Act to CCI
notifying the amalgamation of WBBS Delhi, WBBS Haryana and WBBS Kerela into
WBSPL pursuant to resolution passed under Section 391 to 394 of the Companies
Act, 1956. As per
initial notice, Qualcomm Incorporates (a wholly owned subsidiary of Qualcomm
Asia Pacific Pte Ltd) held 74% of the equity shares of each WBSPL, WBBS Delhi,
WBBS Haryana and WBBS Kerela. Out of the remaining 26%, Tulip Telecom Limited
and Global Holding Corporation Private Limited held 13% equity share capital
each.
·
On May 29, 2012, in terms of Regulation 16 of Competition
Commission of India (Procedure in regards to the transaction of business
relating to the transaction) Regulations, 2011 (“Combination Regulations”),
a change in information was provided by the parties, to the effect that Bharti
Airtel Limited (“Bharti”) had (i) acquired entire 26% equity shares from
Tulip Telecom Limited and Global Holding Corporation Private Limited, and (ii) subscribed
to additional equity shares in each of the companies. As a result, the
aggregate shareholding of Bharti in each of WBSPL, WBBS Delhi, WBBS Haryana and
WBBS Kerela was later increased to 49% and Qualcomm’s shareholding was reduced
to 51%.
·
Further, as per
an agreement signed between Qualcomm and Bharti, subject to terms and
conditions of the agreement, Bharti would assume complete ownership of, WBSPL,
WBBS Delhi, WBBS Haryana and WBBS Kerela, by the end of year 2014.
Order:
·
CCI observed
that the facts related to Bharti were yet not been examined in the notice and
such change of information was likely to affect factors of determination of appreciable adverse
effect on competition significantly. Accordingly, CCI treated the notice
submitted by the parties under Section 6(2) of the Act as invalid under the
provisions of Regulation 16 of the Combination Regulations.
C.2 Order on Combination Registration No.
C-2012/06/61dated June 20, 2012 filed by Hero Investments Private Limited
Background facts:
·
Hero Investments Private Limited (“HIPL”)
and Hero MotoCorp Limited (“HMCL”) filed a notice
dated June 08, 2012 under Section 6(2) of the Act to CCI notifying the
amalgamation of HIPL into HMCL,
pursuant to resolution passed under Section 391 to 394 of the Companies Act,
1956. As per details provided in the notice, HIPL is registered with Reserve
Bank of India (“RBI”) as a systematically important non
deposit taking non-banking finance company. HIPL had also filed an application
with RBI for its registration as a core investment company. HIPL had stated in
its notice that it is only engaged in the business of holding securities in
group companies for the purposes other than trading of such securities.
·
As per notice,
the entire share capital of HIPL is held by the same promoters, who hold entire
share capital of HMCL and two non-residents entities, i.e. BC India Private
Investors II and Lathe Investment Pte Limited. While promoter group holds 71.36
%, BC India Private Investors II and Lathe Investment Pte Limited hold 19.81%
and 8.56% respectively in the share capital of HIPL. HIPL currently holds
43.33% of the share capital of HMCL.
·
HMCL is a listed
company engaged in the business of manufacturing, assembling, marketing,
distribution and selling of motorised two-wheelers and their spare parts and
related services. Promoters group holds total of 52.21% of share capital in HMCL, of which 43.33%
is held through HIPL and remaining through other entities and individuals. The
remaining non-promoter shareholding of 47.79% in HMCL is held by public.
·
As per the notice, pursuant to the proposed combination, entire
business and whole undertaking of HIPL will be transferred to and vested with HMCL. As a result, shareholders of
HIPL will directly hold shares of HMCL, which they currently hold through an
intermediate investment holding company. The shareholding of HMCL pursuant to
proposed combination will be as following:
Promoters: 39.92%
BC India Private Investors II: 8.58%
Lathe Investment Pte Limited: 3.71%
Public: 47.79%
Order:
· CCI held that the above combination will ultimately result in reduction of promoter
shareholding in HMCL from 52.21% to 39.92%. Considering the aforesaid, the CCI
observed that the proposed combination will result in amalgamation of two
companies that are engaged in different business activities, and therefore the
proposed combination is not likely to give rise to any adverse effect on
competition in India. The CCI accordingly approved the proposed combination
under Section 31(1) of the Act.
C.3 Order dated June 20, 2012 on Combination
Registration No.- C-2012/04/54 filed by Varun Shipping
company Limited,Tarun Shipping and Industries Limited, Varun Gas Infrastructure
Limited and Varun Resources Private Limited.
Background facts:
·
Varun Shipping company
Limited (“VSCL”), Tarun Shipping and Industries Limited (“TSIL”), Varun Gas
Infrastructure Limited (“VGIL”)
and Varun Resources Private Limited
(“VRPL”) jointly filed a notice dated April 30, 2012 under Section 6(2)
of the Act to CCI notifying the rearrangement
between VSCL, TSIL, VGIL and other
wholly owned subsidiaries of VSCL and TSIL. The notice related to the scheme of arrangement
and amalgamation under Sections 391 to 394, read with sections 100 to 103 of
the Companies Act, 1956. The scheme involves following steps:
(i) demerger of the ship management and
shipping investment business of VSCL into VGPL, which is a wholly owned
subsidiary of VSCL;
(ii) demerger of offshore shipping and
shipping investment business of TSIL into VMPL, which is a wholly owned
subsidiary of TSIL; and
(iii)
consolidation
of shipping business through amalgamation of VGIL, VSCL remaining after the
demerger of ship management and shipping investment business and TSIL remaining
after the demerger of offshore shipping and shipping investment business, with
VRPL, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of VSCL.
· As per
the information provided in the notice, VSCL is a listed public company engaged in shipping business and ship management and
shipping investment business. The promoter group of VSCL,
namely Varun Corporation Limited (“VCL”), TSIL and Real (Mauritius) Limited,
as on 31st March, 2012, hold 5.54%, 10.02% and 22.23% of equity
shares in VSCL respectively, which
constitutes 37.79% equity share capital in VSCL. The remaining 62.21% equity
share capital of VSCL is held by the public, financial institutions and others.
Real Point (Mauritius) Limited is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VCL. Yudhishthir D. Khatau Group (“YDK Group”) holds more than 99% of equity shares in VCL.
·
As
per information
provided in the notice, TSIL is an unlisted public company engaged in shipping
business and offshore shipping and shipping investment business. VSCL and VCL
hold 49.91% and 49.97% of share capital in TSIL, respectively. VGIL is an unlisted public company
engaged in shipping business. VGIL
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of VSCL.
As stated in the notice, VRPL is
an unlisted public company which is currently not engaged in any business. VGPL and VMPL are currently not engaged in any
business and they would commence business as demerged from VSCL and TSIL,
respectively, after implementation of the proposed combination.
·
Accordingly,
VSCL, TSIL, VGIL, VGPL and VMPL are stated to fall under the ownership and
common control of YDK Group.
Order
·
Considering
the facts on record and the details provide in the notice, the CCI was of the
view that the proposed combination is not likely to have an
appreciable adverse effect on the competition in India, as it would not result
in any change in control over the remaining companies, as all these companies
belong and would belong after the proposed combination to the same YDK Group.The CCI accordingly approved the proposed combination
under Section 31(1) of the Act.
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